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Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer
j Clay Smith, Jr.*
In 1841, three years before the first African American lawyer
was admitted to the bar in the United States, Ralph Waldo Emer-
son asked:
What is a man born for but to be a Reformer, a Re-maker of
what man has made; a renouncer of lies; a restorer of truth
and good, imitating that great Nature which embosoms us all,
and which sleeps no moment on an old past, but every hour
repairs herself, yielding us every morning a new day, and with
every pulsation a new life?
Emerson answered his inquiry as follows: "Let him renounce every-
thing which is not true to him, and put all his practices back on
their first thoughts, and do nothing for which he has not the
whole world for his reason."'
In 1844, Macon Bolling Allen became the first black American
to complete a course of study in law and the first black lawyer for-
mally introduced to jurisprudence,2 at a time when black people
in the nation were considered "far less esteemed than the veriest
stranger and sojourner."' Allen's study of law and his admission to
the bar must have rocked the ages past, as well as the American
experiment of law and equality. Although no record has been
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1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Man the Reformer, in 5 THE WORLD'S BEST ORATIONS: FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 2008 (David J. Brewer ed., 1899) (from
Emerson's peroration of the Address before the Mechanics' Apprentices' Library Associa-
tion, Boston, Jan. 25, 1841).
2 'J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944,
at 93 (1993).
3 Frederick Douglass, The Present Condition and Future Prospects of the Negro People, 2
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860, at
244 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).
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found listing the books or subjects that Allen's private instructor
used to teach him, Allen must have studied from classical sources
to demonstrate to his white examiners that he was qualified to be
admitted to the bar in the State of Maine.4 One can only imagine
the questions that were put to Allen during his oral bar examina-
tion. Perhaps he was questioned on the premises undergirding the
Declaration of Independence.' Or perhaps he was questioned on
the Federal Constitution, elements of the debates between the
Federalist and the Antifederalist, the definition of a slave or the
meaning of citizenship, and his views on the slave provisions6 of
the Constitution. He may have been asked why he wanted to be a
lawyer, or how he planned to function as a lawyer in a nation half
free and half slave. Could the wrong answer to these questions
have influenced the decision to grant or to deny him admission to
4 SMITH, supra note 2, at 95 (stating "[t]he Liberator [1845] . . . reported that Allen
had 'received a classical education.'").
5 During a symposium on the Constitution during the Bicentennial of that docu-
ment, John Hope Franklin indicated "how [early] black leaders almost never referred to
the Constitution as a source of legal protection, turning instead on occasion to the Dec-
laration of Independence." AFRO-AMERICANS AND THE EVOLUTION OF A LIVING CONsTrTu-
TION: CONFERENCE PROGRAM AND SUMMARY 16 (1988).
6 If Allen were asked in 1844 about his views on slavery, it might have been diffi-
cult for him to answer, even before a liberal bar examiner. In 1844, Cassius M. Clay, a
southerner, manumitted all of his slaves. In response, W.J. McKinney, the mayor of Day-
ton, Ohio, wrote to him to canvass Clay's interest for the presidency. Cassius M, Clay,
perhaps because of age, declined the invitation, but declared that he would cast his vote
for Henry Clay, a slaveholding southerner. Clay's lament, or perhaps his reformed liberal
view on slaveholding, was that "[m]en never have and never will . . . think alike: all
government is necessarily a sacrifice, to some extent, of individual will: that is the best
government to each individual which fosters or allows the most of what individual be-
lieves to be conducive to his best interest." Letter from Cassius M: Clay, to Niles' National
Register (Apr. 6, 1844), at 88.
How could Macon Bolling Allen safely answer any question which condemned slav-
ery as opposite to his basic notions of justice and jurisprudence, when men like Cassius
M. Clay, who had manumitted his slaves, continued to ask Americans to judge Henry
Clay not as a slaveholder, but as a promoter of justice and jurisprudence for white Amer-
icans? Clay's letter implicates the church in that "Mr. [Henry] Clay is a slave-holder, in a
community where the whole Christian church of all denominations-the only professed
teacher of morals among the people-are also slave holders. . . ." Id. Indeed. Cassius M.
Clay could have gone even further in his remarks. In 1844, the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion was formed and "actually announced that the denomination was free 'to promote
slavery,'" making the subject of slavery appear moral. PAUL L. BRADY, A CERTAIN BLIND-
NESS: A BLACK FAMILY'S QUEST FOR THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 308-09 (1990). In fact, in
1787, "while the Constitution was being forged in Philadelphia, a [sic] small groups of
black. Christians in that city were pulled from their knees while praying in the segregated
gallery of St. George's Methodist Episcopal Church." Id. at 310; see also Preamble and Arti-
cles of Association of the Free African Society, (Apr. 12, 1787) in CHARLES H. WESLEY, RICH-
ARD ALLEN: APOSTLE OF FREEDOM 269-71 (1935) (the Free African Society was a black
religious society that was formed to build its own churches).
[Vol. 69:5
JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE
the bar? Might Allen boldly have declared his intention to use the
law to help emancipate his people from slavery, "to be a Reform-
er, a Re-maker of what man has made [and] a renouncer of
lies ... ?"1
What may have been difficult for Macon Bolling Allen to
foresee in 1844 is clear to his legal progenies in 1994, the sesqui-
centennial anniversary of the black lawyer in America. In the
words of Emerson, the black lawyer was determined "to see 'to it
that the world [was] the better for [himself and his people] and
to find [his] reward in the act."8
I. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE
The first known comprehensive book on jurisprudence written
by blacks was the brainchild of black people. Written with the
assistance of black lawyers and funded and influenced by black
men and women, it was entitled, Justice and Jurisprudence: An Inqui-
ry Concerning the Constitutional Limitations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments.9 The book, authored by the Brotherhood
of Liberty, was published in 1889, one hundred and two years
after the United States Constitution was ordained, ninety-eight
years after the first decision was issued by the U.S. Supreme
Court,"0 forty-five years after Macon Bolling Allen was admitted to
the bar, and twenty-four years after John Swett Rock became the
first black lawyer admitted to practice beforie the U.S. Supreme
Court."
The purpose of this Article is to acknowledge the entry of
black lawyers into the jurisprudential matrix as jurisprudents, as
well as law enforcers (litigators). A review of the legal literature by
7 Emerson, supra note 1. The pioneer black lawyer, who no doubt studied the
classical commentaries of Blackstone, Kent, Wheaton, and other scholars of the day, had
to be aware of the ongoing debate on the question of whether natural law, as a funda-
mental source of law, had "any meaning independent of the 'public acts' in which it
appeared?" G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835,
at 679 (abridged ed. 1991). I believe that the only response that the pioneer black law-
yer could have made to this inquiry was that a civilized nation had embodied natural
right and natural law themes into the written Constitution in the same degree for both
black and white people.
8 Emerson, supra note 1.
9 THE BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE: AN INQUIRY CONCERN-
ING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS (1969) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE].
10 West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 401 (1791).
11 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 101.
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the great writers of modem times has failed to discover writings
authored by or citing to black lawyers, or any writings that charac-
terize the black lawyer as a jurisprudent. Since 1844, one is hard
pressed to identify from hundreds of treatises, case books, legal
histories, and law review articles on jurisprudence, any comprehen-
sive treatment of the first principles advanced by black lawyers. It
is also difficult to find any of their critical reviews of actions taken
by the courts adverse to the emancipation of their people, even
though black lawyers were important thinkers in the transforma-
tion of modem American constitutionalism and the common
law. 
2
In 1841, the same year that Ralph Waldo Emerson called on
man to "renounce everything which [was] not true to him,""3 and
three years before Macon Bolling Allen became America's first
black lawyer, Augustus Comte found "no absolute contradiction
between slavery and nature or slavery and Christianity." 4 Yet, with
the discovery of America, scholar Abb6 Raynal and his co-authors
concluded that the discovery "had profoundly influenced the histo-
ry of the world .... [T]he great question was whether this influ-
ence had furthered human progress or had only brought more
rapid change.""5 Raynal may have been one of the authors whom
the first black lawyers consulted, because "Raynal thought that
slavery was contrary to nature and thus universally wrong."
16
While Raynal's views may have helped to slow the slave trade in
Europe, the slave traders in America renewed their interest in this
enterprise." For Macon Bolling Allen and the other black lawyers
12 The Brotherhood of Liberty believed that "[t]he future solution of all race-prob-
lems in America must depend Upon the learned and faithful exposition of the historical,
political, constitutional, and common-law significance of the pregnant provisions and com-
mandments of [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments]." JUSTICE AND
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 437.
13 Emerson, supra note 1.
14 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 19-20 (1966)
(citing AUGUSTE COMTE, Cours de philosophie positive (Paris, 1840-42), V, 186-93).
15 Id. at nn.24-25 (citing Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique
des istablissemers et du commerce des Europens dans les duex Indes (1781)).
16 Id. at 14.
17 In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, an estimated 500,000 Africans were
captured from expeditions from Nantes, France. Recently disclosed documents reveal that
"[i]n Nantes and elsewhere in Europe, the slave trade spawned its own economy. From
1707-1847, records show, 3,829 slaving 'expeditions' left from France alone . . . . One
ship of slaves could yield up to three or four shiploads of coffee, sugar, indigo, cacao,
cotton-produced by slave labor . . . ." Marlise Simons, Unhappily, Port Confronts its Past:
Slave Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at A4. "At Nantes, documents ... convey how
slave business operated ...from what became known as 'the triangular trade.' (The same
[Vol. 69:5
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soon to be admitted to the bar, the question was: Could "the
great promise of America ... be fulfilled without the abolition of
slavery[?],"'
In 1844, what Macon Boiling Allen saw occurring in America
was the enforcement of heinous slave codes.'9 Professor Kelly
Miller of Howard University has written that the "African slave was
introduced into this country as a pure animal instrumentality to
perform the rougher work under dominion of his white lord and
master. There was not the remotest thought of his human person-
ality [and] his human capabilities were emphatically denied.""
Yet, in bondage, the African personality, unlearned in legal terms
used in colonial courts, naturally conceptualized that its forced
condition was wrong and fundamentally contrary to the principles
of human dignity. The Abolitionists,2 ' who initiated the anti-slav-
ery movement, understood this.22 The slaves, as witnessed by their
ships carried European goods to Africa, exchanged them for slaves, took the slaves to the
Americas and returned to Europe loaded with sugar, tobacco, coffee . . . and other trop-
ical produce.)" Id. France banned slavery in 1817.
18 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 16.
19 See Appendix for extracts of American Slave Codes. See generally J.D. WHEELER, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY (1837).
20 Kelly Miller, Education for Manhood, in MASTERPIECES OF NEGRO ELOQUENCE 445-
446 (Alice Moore Dunbar ed., 1970). One leading early American historian states well
the plight of slaves: "'The negro race, from the first, was regarded with disgust, and its
union with the whites forbidden under ignominious penalties.'" DAVIS, supra note 14, at
23 (quoting GEORGE BANCROFr, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE DISCOVERY OF
THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 177 (14th ed. 1874)).
21 "By Abolitionists we mean those who denounce and reprobate those slaveholding
rebels ... with blackened hearts and bloody hands, [who are] waging a ferocious war
for the destruction of the American Government .... Abolitionists, are now loudest in
denouncing the rebels and traitors and urging a vigorous prosecution of the [Civil War]
for the preservation of the Government." FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Duty of Abolitionists in
the Present State of the County, in 3 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: THE
CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865, at 165-66 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1952). See generally LOUIS
RUCHAMES, THE ABOLITIONISTS (1963).
22 According to Charles H. Wesley, "the first abolition society was organized in
[Pennsylvania in 1775]." CHARLES H. WESLEY, RICHARD ALLEN: APOSTLE OF FREEDOM 8
(1935). In the mid 1850s, Macon Bolling Allen and Robert Morris, Sr., the nation's first
and second black lawyers, may not have been totally convinced that the Abolitionists were
absolutely committed to the emancipation of slaves, given the Abolitionists formalistic
interpretation of the Constitution. Allen and Morris were no doubt aware of the Declara-
tion of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society, adopted in 1833. The Declara-
tion stated that "all . . . laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery,
are . . . before God utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine
prerogative ... they ought instantly to be abrogated." Declaration of Sentiments of the Amer-
ican Anti-Slaveiy Society, Adopted at the Formation of Said Society, (proceedings of the Anti-
Slavery Convention, Assembled at Philadelphia, Dec. 4-6, 1833) reprinted in RUCHAMES,
supra note 21, at 81. While the Abolitionists made declarations against slavery, published
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heroic acts to escape slavery,' declared themselves not to be in-
strumentalities of white masters, but equal beings. Though
chained, they were always free, though their declared freedom was
distilled in mind only.24 The anti-slavery movements helped con-
firm the original declaration of the slaves that no chains or laws
could enslave their nature as free persons.2 6
pamphlets, and preached against it, they also supported the principle solemnly advanced
by slaveholders: that Congress under the Constitution, did not have power to interfere
with states' rights to authorize or permit slavery. The -1833 Declaration of Sentiments "unani-
mously recognise [sic] the sovereignty of each State, to legislate exclusively on the subject
of the slavery which is tolerated within its limits [and] concede[d] that Congress under
the present national compact, has no right to interfere with any of the slave States, in
relation to this momentous subject." Id. at 82. The power of Congress, they declared,
reached only to suppress the "domestic slave trade between the several States, and to
abolish slavery in those portions of our territory which the Constitution has placed under
its exclusive jurisdiction." Id.
23 See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 205-13 (1966); WIL-
LIAM STYRON, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER (1967).
24 As I previously have written, "Afro-Americans enslaved and unrecognized as hu-
man beings rejected the contemporary view of their state of legal non-existence and
chose to 'stand the storm' and 'walk together.' They buried the word 'weary.' The con-
cept of freedom and liberty remained poised 'in essence' but the hope that freedom and
liberty would vest 'in being' always remained. Hence, for the early [black] poets, the
concept of freedom was not attainable on earth: Freedom existed 'over me' -and the poet
made it clear that the Afro-American symbolically chose the grave over slavery for it was
only with their God that they could partake of freedom." J. Clay Smith, Jr., "The Social
Dynamics of Afro-American Poetry:. An Evaluation," presented at the Sun Gallery, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 1981), at 4 (on file with author). See, e.g., Oh, Freedom, in SONGS
OF ZION 102 (1981) (United Methodist Hymnal). See also Lawrence W. Levine, Slave Songs
and Slave Consciousness, in AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A MODERN READER 153, 168 (Allen
Weinstein & Frank Otto Gatell eds., 2d ed. 1973).
25 See generally WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART ON SLAVERY (Luther
Rawson Marsh ed., 1969). In 1835, Stewart stated, "We, even we, white-skinned Repub-
licans, appear to be on the eve of losing our rights as white men, for having, from the
deepest impulses of humanity, become the slave's organ, to explain to an unfeeling world
the wrongs inflicted upon him." Id. at 53.
26 The authors of JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE would have been familiar with the
poetry of George Moses Horton: "His first book Poems of a Slave appeared in 1829, and
other books followed until 1865." ROBERT THOMAS KERLIN, NEGRO POETS AND THEIR PO-
EMS 25 (1923). The early black bards can be consulted to ascertain the philosophy of
slaves who opposed slavery and supported liberty. Horton's poem, which follows in part,
is instructive about how slaves called for liberty under their own powers of thought and
imagination:
Alas! and am I born for this
To wear this slavish chain?
Deprived of all created bliss,
Through hardship, toil, and pain?
How long have I in bondage lain
And languished to be free!




Though slavery was an unnatural and unsatisfying condition, it
flourished in the ancient world. As David Brion Davis, the author
of The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture states, "there had been
no moral influence to overcome the specious arguments of Aristot-
le, who had confused nature with the actual institutions of the
city-state, and had provided sophisms for all future apologists for
slavery."27 The moral force of state supported slavery and the
powerful pens of scholars like Augustus Comte, "found profound
meaning in Aristotle's theory that some men are slaves by na-
ture."' Yet, even Comte was no absolutist on the permanence of
slavery. He believed that as "society progressed through monotheis-
tic and metaphysical states," it became useless, and "reversed the
course of progress . .. of a rational society." '
From his earliest days, the black lawyer embraced principles of
equality and particularly was aware "of the American paradox: that
the land of the free was the home of the slave; that in practice,
equality meant equality among propertied white men; and that
constitutional liberty extended only to whites."' Justice and Juris-
prudence was the work of the Brotherhood of Liberty, a group of
black persons in Baltimore, Maryland, lead by Reverend Harvey
Johnson."1 The group was formed on June 2, 1885.2 Ironically,
one purpose of this group was to fight against "restrictions...
prohibiting blacks from becoming members of the Maryland
bar."' In 1885, as a direct result of the agitation of the Broth-
erhood of Liberty, this purpose was realized when Everett J.
Waring was admitted to the Maryland bar after his graduation
from Howard University's law school in June, 1885." The overall
Come, Libertyl thou cheerful sound,
Roll through my ravished ears;
Come, let my grief in joys be drowned,
And drive away my f6ars.
Id. at 26.
27 DAvis, supra note 14, at 18.
28 Id. at 20.
29 Id.
30 DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT at viii (1991).
31 See generally WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, THE BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY: OUR DAY IN
COURT (1891).
32 Id. at 7.
33 SMITH, supra note 2, at 143.
34 Id.
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purpose of the Brotherhood of Liberty, one that would be pro-
foundly more difficult, was "to crusade against denial of liberty ac-
cording to race," 5 and to "use all legal means within [their] pow-
er to procure and maintain [their] rights as citizens of [their]
common country. "-
6
Reverend Harvey Johnson and Everett J. Waring, recognizing
that "the Negro was [considered] an inferior being in America,"
concluded that "[i]f he was to progress, there would have to be
marked changes in how he and his rights were viewed by the
nation and its judges.""7 Reverend Johnson's aim was to influence
critical thinking about race through the use of a book: Justice and
Jurisprudence.'
In 1886, Everett J. Waring, one year out of the Howard Uni-
versity School of Law, wrote an article titled, The Judicial Function
in Government,9 the first scholarly article by a black lawyer in the
State of Maryland. The article "expressed skepticism about the
judicial power exercised in Dred Scott v. Sandford because such
judicial power had ordained white power as superior .... ."0
With black lawyers in their group, the Brotherhood of Liberty was
prepared to invade the matrix of jurisprudential thought to com-
35 Id.
36 WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, THE BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY: OUR DAY IN COURT 7
(1891).
37 Elaine K. Freeman, A Study of Leadership in the Baltimore Community, 1880-
1900, at 55 (1968) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Washington University).
38 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9. In the Preface, the Brotherhood of Lib-
erty desired to offer a "[mature) reflection" on matters "involved in the much-mooted
race-question." Id. at i. Rev. Harvey Johnson and Everett J. Waring knew that "[uin no
other profession does the book . . . play a greater role than in . . law .... Yet, so
little is known about the development of American legal literature and the individuals
who have contributed to its development" ERWIN C. SURRENC'Y, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW PUBLISHING 1 (1990). This is particularly true when it comes to early black lawyers
and black jurisprudents. In 1889. they, like Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell,
believed that "[1]aw [was] a science, and all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books." Walter Wheeler Cook, Law and the Modern Mind: Legal Logic,
in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE FROM COLUMBIA LAW REvIEw 380, 381 n.33 (1963) (quoting
Christopher C. Langdell, Address at the Celebration of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1887),
in 3 L.Q. Rev. 123, 123-24 (1887)). JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, and the language and
legal culture represented in it "originate[d] in a popular spirit [and] a common convic-
tion of right." Edwin W. Patterson, Historical and Evolutionay Theories of Law, in ESSAYS ON
JURISPRUDENCE FROM COLUMBIA LAW REIEW 281 (1963). Its original purpose was to
counter the science of words and phrases in other books and writings which subjugated
people of color.
39 2 AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH REv. 437 (April 1886).
40 J. Clay Smith, Jr., Thurgood Marshall: An Heir of Charles Hamilton Houston, 20




bat racist thinking and to make a "sober investigation and dissec-
tion" of the court opinions "which [had] produced or suffered
the ... obscuration of the great political truths of the' [Thir-
teenth,] Fourteenth, [and Fifteenth] Amendment[s]. ' Members
41 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 42. The book's authorship was simply
"Brotherhood of Liberty." The book gives no reason to question the authorship of the
Brotherhood of Liberty. See WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 4 (listing life mem-
bers). One scholar claims that the Brotherhood of Liberty wrote only the first 43 pages,
and that John Henry Keene, a white lawyer, wrote the remaining 535. Elaine K. Freeman,
supra note 37, at 55. Speculation even surrounds the authorship of the 43 pages attrib-
uted to the Brotherhood of liberty. Freeman concludes that only Rev. Harvey Johnson
wrote the first 43 pages of the book. Id.
Freeman's assumptions and conclusions are subject to question given the in-
volvement of several black lawyers in the Brotherhood of liberty and given the fact that
a review of the book gives no indication that the Brotherhood of liberty did not author
the book. T.M. Wakeman, Justice and Jurisprudence: 'An Inquiry Concerning the Constitutional
Limitations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 15 SCIENCE 16 (Jan. 10,
1890) (book review). The reviewer notes:
That this publication should appear anonymously is a matter to be regretted.
The plain avowal of a public purpose by every American citizen is his preroga-
tive and duty. If he is a member of the bar, it is still more a duty to relieve
the country from an error of the courts affecting grave public interests, by hon-
estly . . . explaining the error, and indicating the remedy. . . . We have entire-
ly too much unhealthy private grumbling, and too many secret societies seeking
to do covertly what no American need be ashamed of. We believe that the col-
ored people back of this movement would do better to give their names ....
Id. at 17.
It is likely that Everett J. Waring, one of the colored people behind this movement,
played a key role in the authorship of JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE. Waring was present at
the first general meeting of the Brotherhood of Liberty which convened on October 19,
1885. He was a member of a special committee that reviewed actions of the Board and
recommended legal actions. Other black lawyers from around the nation, such as William
E. Matthews (from Washington, D.C.), and John H. Butler, an 1873 Howard University
law graduate, attended the first general meeting. Butler was one of the speakers at this
meeting. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 13. William Henry Richardson, who joined the
Howard University law faculty in 1890 after JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE was published,
also could have worked on the manuscript. Richardson graduated from Howard
University's law school in 1881 and was listed as an active participant in the Brotherhood
of Liberty prior to the publication of the book. Id. at 23. Other black lawyers were aware
of the formation of the Brotherhood of Liberty, including Richard T. Greener, an 1876
graduate of the University of South Carolina Law School, and Judge George Lewis Ruffin,
who in 1869 was Harvard University's first black law graduate, and who, in 1885, sat on
the District Court of Boston. Both Greener and Ruffin sent letters which were read dur-
ing the October meeting "regretting their inability to be present." Id. at 8; see SMITH,
supra note 2, at 33, 46-47, 221.
Further evidence supports the involvement of Everett J. Waring and other black
lawyers in the writing of JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, because in 1886 Waring demonstrat-
ed his gift for legal scholarship in his article, The Judicial Function in Governmen supra
note 39, at 437. This article was written three years before JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE
was published. In 1886, a second Howard University law graduate, Joseph S. Davis, had
1994]
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of the Brotherhood of Liberty, most of whom were born under
the yoke of slavery, declared a "desire [for] a comprehensive re-
view of the jurisprudence of those motley bodies of legists whose
decisions . . . gave them 'free and untrammelled authority to pass
rules and regulations under State laws' for the conduct of the
public business [which] constitute the practical, scientific, philo-
sophic, historical, and commercial judicature of civil rights in
America."42 The Brotherhood of Liberty was interested in "a
philosophic account of the jurisprudence of race-prejudice, and of
become a member of the Maryland bar and an active member of the Brotherhood of
Liberty, while even perhaps, he was in law school or months after he received his law
degree. By November of 1886, he had already begun to express his views on political
themes. J.S. Davis, Lawyer Davis' Citicism, N.Y. FREEMAN, Dec. 4, 1886, at 2; ALEXANDER,
supra note 31, at 19; SMITH, supra note 2, at 144. Therefore, it is plausible that Waring,
Davis, Butler, Greener, Richardson, Matthews, and Ruffin wrote and/or advised Rev.
Harvey Johnson and the Brotherhood of Liberty on the preliminary concepts to be cov-
ered in the book, or the substance and meaning of the drafts of JUSTICE AND JURISPRU-
DENCE. This is particularly true with respect to Waring, who served for a short period as
president of the Brotherhood of Liberty (1887), and Davis who in 1887, was elected to
the Board. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 20. Judge Ruffin's participation in this venture
was of short duration. J. Gordon Street, Death of George L. Ruffin, N.Y. FREEMAN, Nov. 27,
1886, at 1.
JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE was published following a request by The Brotherhood
of Liberty that "Their Counsel" research and answer the question of "whether the Four-
teenth Amendment is sovereign, or whether citizen-kings in America have prerogatives
superior to those dictates of reason and justice which it embodies." JUSTICE AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 40, 42. It (the Brotherhood) demanded "to know whether
there is not to be a grandeur solution of the problem of citizenship in America than the
labor-kings, the public-servants, and the labor-classes." Id. Given The Brotherhood of
Liberty's determination to advance counterthoughts on constitutional interpretation rela-
tive to black people, it is not likely that it would have left all the fine points of this
groundbreaking enterprise solely in the hands of Keene, although he apparently was a
friend of the black community. SMITH, supra note 2, at 179 n.176. Everett J. Waring was
"counsel for the Brotherhood since its organization." ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 43.
It is not conjecture; if black lawyers and black people had not inaugurated the idea
or had not, written and contributed to JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, it is unlikely that
such a volume would have been completed for some years to come. In this context,
upon an earlier time, the following statement of Professor Duncan Kennedy has real
significance: "It would be farfetched to argue that the race of these lawyers was irrelevant
to their choice of subject matter, or that the black civil rights cause would have evolved
in the same way had all of the lawyers involved been white." Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural
Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 706, 729. While there
have been responses, pro and con, to Professor Kennedy's statement, I believe that JUS-
TICE AND JURISPRUDENCE speaks for itself, and that the subject matter of this discourse is
the product of black lawyers and black laymen, perhaps in cooperation with Keene, or
vice versa. Compare Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE
LJ. 1157, 1161 (con) with Jerome McCristal Gulp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Ra-
cial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1102-1103 n.20
(pro).
42 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 42.
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the history of its lineal descent from the ancestral jurisprudence of
slavery."4
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND SLAVERY
The Brotherhood of Liberty understood that the doctrine of
equality was planted in America as a white theme, and that "jjt]he
doctrine of inequality was originally transported to, and planted
upon . .. [American] soil in the form of slavery."" There can be
little doubt that the black lawyer and black lay activists, such as
Frederick Douglass, believed in natural law or natural rights
themes. 5 Although no known black people were involved in the
constitutional debates preceding the adoption of the Constitution,
had there been, it is not likely that they would have supported its
slave provisions.46
Under the terms of the Constitution, the slave trade or "mi-
gration and importation" provision was conferred by Article 1,
Section 9; the fugitive slave provision, by Article 4, Section 2; the
insurrection provision, by Article 1, Section 8; and the three-fifths
provision, by Article 1, Section 2. The slave trade provision autho-
rized "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the
43 Id. Even after the great postulates of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were conferred, their confirmation was doubted by the Brotherhood of
Liberty because of the continued presence "of tyranny and power" and the "spirit of
dominion masquerading in America under the guise of a, permanently privileged
class ... ." The "badge of servitude" seemed unwilling to die. Id. at 439-40. See generally
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF Hu-
MANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
44 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 464.
45 Natural law and natural right themes, although different, "typically run together."
WHITE, supra note 7, at 676. During the Marshall Court, natural law and constitutional
law appear to have been interconnected. The reasons for this may be debateable. Howe%'-
er, scholars have reasoned that the tie was rooted in the principles of the American
Revolution, which "had given a practical meaning to natural rights principles: natural law
had evolved from its religious origins to a secular principle of late-eighteenth-century
political theory, encompassed in the idea of the inalienable rights of man." Id. at 675. See
also William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reason-
ing in Nineteenth Centuiy America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1974).
46 For example, Frederick Douglass stated, "I ...deny that the Constitution guaran-
tees the right to hold properfy in man." Frederick Douglass, Speech, The Constitution, of
the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?, in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860, supra note 3, at 468. See also FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, Position of the Government Toward Slavery, in 3 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FRED-
ERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860, supra note 3, at 104, 108 (Douglass
states that "[in a moral and humane point of view, the conduct of our Government
towards the few slaves coming within their power, would be a disgrace to savages."
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States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be pro-
hibited prior to the year 1808." Although the word "slavery" was
not used in the Constitution, it was understood that the words
"migration and importation" meant slavery.47 For the majority of
the Framers, the slave trade "could be justified on the prficiples
47 Between 1849 and 1860, Frederick Douglass switched his views on whether the
Constitution represented a pro-slavery document. In 1849, the progressive Douglass be-
lieved "as I have ever . . , that the original intent and meaning of the Constitution
(the one given to it by the men who framed it, those who adopted, and the one given
to it by the Supreme Court of the United States) makes. it a pro-slavery instrument -
such . . . [as] one . . . I cannot bring myself to vote under, or swear to support." FRED-
ERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution and Slavery, in I THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: EARLY YEARS, 1817-1849 352-53 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950). In a second state-
ment in 1849, Douglass stated, "What ... we would be understood to mean now, is
simply this-that the Constitution of the United States, standing alone, and construed
only in the light of its letter, without reference to the opinions of the men who framed
and adopted it, or to the uniform, universal and undeviating practice of the nation un-
der it, from the time of its adoption until now, is not a pro-slavery instrument." Id. at
361-62. Here, Douglass, without reference to the opinions of the slaveholders who would
control the states in which slavery was practiced, rejected the real subtext of the Framers.
In a formalistic manner, Douglass advanced a view that the authority to enslave was be-
yond the power of the states to impose under the "letter" of the Constitution.
In 1860, Douglass, again using a textual analysis, argued that the nation and the
courts should close its eyes to the pro-slavery debates leading to the adoption of the
Constitution: "These debates form no part of the original agreement. I repeat, the paper
itself, and only the paper itself, with its own plainly-written purposes, is the Constitution."
DOUGLASS, supra note 46, at 467, 469. In light of the foregoing, it is curious why
Douglass ignored the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional debates under the
slave provisions, unless he rejected the power of the Court to interpret not only the
Constitution, but the meaning of its content drawn from antecedent debates. This posi-
tion, if it were a position, would have been uncharacteristic of Douglass's usually brilliant
commentaries. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 7, at 681. In contrast, the renowned historian,
John Hope Franklin, has stated, "I don't believe we know enough about our founding
fathers and how they implanted racist doctrines in our Constitution and practiced those
doctrines in our early history. They established the doctrines in such a way that it would
take centuries to dismantle." Frank L. Matthews, The Genius of John Hope Franklin:
America's Truly Great Historian, 10 BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., No. 23, at 16.
Although Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first black Supreme Court justice, and
Frederick Douglass were men from the same philosophical mold, it appears that Marshall
did not fully conform with Douglass' later view that the Constitution was color-blind.
Marshall determined that the Constitution was flawed because the "Constitution did not
condemn slavery; rather the Constitution was defective at the start." Resolutions in Tribute
of the Late Justice Thurgood Marshall, 114 S. Ct CXIX, CXXVII (1993) (citing Thurgood
Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1,
2, 5 (1987). However, both Marshall, the realist, and Douglass, the formalist, held the
same view that the Constitution should be interpreted as a living document, a living fact,
one capable of enlarging the fundamental themes of citizenship of the slave progeny. See
Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 HoW. LJ. 623 (1987);
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution and Slavery, supra at 361, 363 ("The Constitution is
not an abstraction. It is a living ... fact, exerting a mighty power over the nation of
which it is the bond of Union.").
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of religion, humanity and justice; for certainly to translate a set of
human-beings from a bad country [Africa], to a better country
[America], was fulfilling every part of these principles."48
If racial subjugation entered the text of the Constitution as a
condition of forming the Union, one is inclined to wonder wheth-
er the provision facilitating-the termination of slave importation by
1808 directly or indirectly incorporated a. natural right exception
in the Constitution. Specifically, after 1808, Africans would be
excepted from the abuses of slavery and would be able to make
claims for justice, be immune by law from slave-import commerce
and from slavery per se.49 No case ever tested the exception ad-
vanced here." In 1808, the demand for the continuation of slav-
ery in the South did not end. Because of "the introduction of the
cotton-plant into the Southern States,""' the economic interest in
the engine of slavery vigorously pushed on. This single act, and its
"cultivation as an article of profitable commerce, increased the
demand for laborers of African birth or descent, who . . . were
supposed to be the best adapted, if not alone able, to bear the
exposure incident to that species of cultivation."52
No doubt. the Brotherhood of Liberty was aware that not all
white people favored slavery during debate of the slave provisions
at the constitutional convention. For example, George Mason
48 Should One Experiment with Liberty, or Tamper with Slavery? Rawlins Lowndes and Ed-
ward Rutledge Debate in the South Carolina Legislature, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITU-
TION 19, 20 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). The justification for the domestic slave com-
merce continued until the Civil War. Hence, the early black lawyers, admitted to the bar
prior to the Civil War, were faced with a view that their African ancestry was from a
"bad country" and that the slave trade which uprooted Africans from their homeland
fulfilled all that was good. After adoption of the Constitution, such logic would shape the
principles of religion, humanity, and justice, a logic which the black lawyer rejected. See
generally SMITH, supra note 2.
49 Arguably, God's law, rooted in natural law and referred to in "abstract principles
of justice, humanity, [and] tolerance," would enter in full into American culture, no
doubt to be questioned by those who believed that no justice, human recognition or
racial tolerance would bind the nation without an expressed declaration and grant of
power to protect blacks from positive, municipal or public law "by which was meant writ-
ten law." WHITE, supra note 7, at 677.
50 One wonders whether Africans were viewed as being outside the protection of
natural law. Black people may have been told by a court or political body that to the
extent they were subjugated to slavery and considered as the property of their white
slaveholders, they were unable to roam the land by virtue of their racial characteristics.
See infra, Appendix, for extracts of American Slave Codes.
51 WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 267 (1856).
52 Id.
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thought the allowance of the slave trade provision to be "a fatal
section" in the Constitution. 3 Mason believed that "[tihe aug-
mentation of slaves weaken[ed] the States; and [that] such a trade
[was] diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind." 4 On the
other hand, James Madison argued for Union over Justice55 be-
cause the "Southern States would not have entered into the Union
of America, without the temporary permission of that trade."56
Madison tailored his view by reference to the Articles of Confeder-
ation which, he argued, contained no limitation on the slave
trade. At least, Madison' claimed, under the present Constitution,
"an end may be put to [the slave trade] after 20 years,"57 a term
limit that was viewed by some with much skepticism. 8
III. HEAVEN-BORN JUSTICE
In 1850, just as the new Fugitive Slave Act became law,59 six
53 George Mason and James Madison Debate the Slave-Trade Clause, in 2 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 706.
54 Id.
55 During preratification debates, the question whether the great object of Govern-
ment was justice or Union loomed large. However, what justice for the qlave was lost
during the debate on whether slaves constituted property for purposes of taxation or
persons for purposes of Congressional representation. See Patrick Henry Elaborates His Main
Objections, and James Madison Responds, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITTION, supra
note 48, at 673; THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 196.
56 George Mason and James Madison Debate the Slave-Trade Clause, supra note 53, at 707.
57 Id.
58 David Ramsay of South Carolina was one such skeptic:
Though Congress may forbid the importation of negroes after 21 years, it does
not follow that they will. On the other hand, it is probable that they will not. The
more rice we make, the more business will be for their shipping: their interest
will therefore coincide with our's. Besides, we have other sources of supply--the
importations of the ensuing 20 years, added to the natural increase of those we
already have, and the influx from our northern neighbours, who are desirous of
getting rid of their slaves, will afford a sufficient number for cultivating all the
lands in this state.
"Civis" [David Ramsey] to the Citizens of South Carolina, in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 48, at 152 (emphasis added). In accordance with the constitutional
provision that the importation of the slave trade end in 1808, Congress banned expe-
ditions to Africa that could not be completed before January 1, 1808. Other provisions
prohibited coastwide trade, if such trade was carried on ships of less than forty tons.
John Hope Franklin reported that "there was little real reason for rejoicing" after Con-
gress acted on the measure because "from the beginning, the law went unenforced." He
further stated that the first underground railroad was not that carried on by the aboli-
tionists to get Negro slaves to freedom but the one carried on by merchants and others
to introduce more Negroes into slavery." JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 154 (3d ed. 1967).
59 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 2, at 96, 98 (summarizing Robert Morris's legal de-
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years after Macon Bolling Allen's admission to the bar, and six
years before the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, George
Bancroft, an American historian, released his fourteenth edition of
the History of the United States. David Brion Davis reported that
Brancroft found nothing peculiar about the institution of slavery
and that "unlike [Henri Alexandre] Wallon, [an important French
scholar of the time, Bancroft] found no continuing contest be-
tween liberty and bondage in the ancient world."' Bancroft's po-
sition is likely to have disheartened Macon Bolling Allen and Rob-
ert Morris, Sr., America's second black' lawyer admitted to the
Massachusetts bar in 1847. Bancroft held an even more startling
view that slavery "might be planted in other promised lands with-
out blighting their mission ... [as] extraneous""' to America's
mission. Allen no doubt agreed with Wallon in that slavery in
America was an act of violence,62 contrary to the teachings of
Christ, and a "brusque departure from the normal development of
humanity."63
Members of the Brotherhood of Liberty clamored "for a liber-
al and spiritual construction of [the] broad charter of freedom."'
They believed that they were in the society as free persons before
this state of violence and struggle was constitutionally redefined by
"seiz[ing their] rights."'
Freedom is a natural state, and the Brotherhood of Liberty
viewed "American civil rights [as] intimately associated with man's
true nature, his real inward essence, as it stands correlated to the
physical. " ' They viewed the Anglo-Saxon's march toward the ul-
timate truths in the Declaration of Independence and the Consti-
tution' as events that "postulated man's likeness to God as a fun-
fense of the slave Shadrack in Boston).
60 DAvIS, supra note 14, at 21.
61 Id. at 21-22.
62 Contemporary scholars have written on the subject of violence and law. See general-
ly Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and
Legal Theory, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 211-50 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
63 DAvis, supra note 14, at 19.
64 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 428.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 421.
67 It has been written that:
When Independence was declared at Philadelphia in 1776, America was yet a
unit in the possession of slaves, and when the Constitution of 1787 was or-
dained, the institution still existed in every one of the thirteen States save Massa-
chusetts only. True its decay had begun where it was no longer profitable, but
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damental principle."' a The Brotherhood of Liberty believed that
the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, the "three rolls. .. lodged in the ark
of the covenant of civil liberty,"69 was a blessing from God, an an-
swer to the prayers of the slaves, and a sign that God had deliv-
ered them from the Union's bondage. They believed "that theo-
logical influence"" passed into the text of the amendments, often
called the "Negro's charter of liberty."7 However, they must have
wondered whether jurisprudence was capable of recognizing the
humanity of contemporary black people and "whether God's jus-
tice [could] be denied [to] any race which bears His image."'
The Brotherhood of Liberty was certain that the ratification of the
emancipatory amendments to the Constitution "testified to
[America's] unflinching confidence in the celestial origin, and the
final triumph upon earth, of Heaven-born Justice.""
IV. BLACK PEOPLE: PRIMA FACIE CITIZENS
In Justice and Jurisprudence, the members of the Brotherhood
of Liberty asserted a belief that after the abolition of slavery in
1865 and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868
that nothing should have stood in the way of black people to
claim all rights, privileges and immunities vested in the Constitu-
every State united in its recognition in the federal compact, and the very fabric
of our representative government was built upon it, as three-fifths of the slaves
were counted in the basis of representation in the Congress of the United
States, and property in it was protected by rigid provisions regarding the rendi-
tion of fugitive slaves escaping from one State to another.
John W. Daniel, Was Jefferson Davis a Traitor? in 4 THE WORLD'S BEST ORATIONS: FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT.TIME, supra note 1, at 1618.
68 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 422.
69 Id. at 138. See generally BENJAMIN E. MAYS, THE NEGRO'S GOD AS REFLECTED IN His
LITERATURE (1938); CARTER G. WOODSON, THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO CHURCH 164-65
(3d ed. 1972).
70 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 363.
71 Bernard H. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Negro Since 1920, at 1
(1946) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University).
72 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 499.
73 Id. at 503. Black lawyers' "search after the primal truth of Providence embodied
in these [emancipatory] amendments" has been "long, obscure, continuous, laborious,
and unremitting." Id. at 450. Among the first principles advanced by black jurisprudes
was that it was the "will of the Supreme Being . . . that all human liberties be recog-
nized." Id. at 452. They believed that "Olurisprudence should perceive that the perpetual
struggle for the establishment of the universal equality of mankind is in accordance with
the decree of the Almighty," id. at 445, and that the "postulate of Providence
culminat(ed] in the Fourteenth Amendment." Ld. at 431.
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tion. They believed that the rights and privileges of free persons
of color had been decided by the U.S; Attorney General in 1862,
three years prior to the abolition of slavery 4 and six years prior
to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1862, Edward Bates, the U.S. Attorney General, rendered
an opinion on the question whether " [f]ree men of color, if born
in the United States, are citizens of the United States; and, if
otherwise qualified, are competent, according to the Acts of Con-
gress, to be masters of vessels engaged in the coasting trade."'
Attorney General Bates answered this question affirmatively. In
1889, this opinion was important to the Brotherhood because
black citizens, then free by law, continued to face limitations on
rights available to white citizens. Hence, they pointed to Attorney
General Bates' opinion to demonstrate that the law interpreted by
the courts limiting the civil rights of people of color after emanci-
pation was contrary to the Constitution."
In 1889, the position of the Brotherhood of Liberty on the
question of citizenship was the same as that issued by Attorney
General Bates in 1862: A free person was not legally incapacitated
to be a full citizen of the United States because of his -color.7
Further, the Brotherhood of Liberty opined that with the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment, dual citizenship eliminated any
national or local distinction between coloreds, mixed bloods and
blacks of pure-blooded African ancestry." It believed that, under
the Fourteenth Amendment and Attorney General Bates' opinion,
"every person born in the country is at the moment of birth, pri-
ma fade a citizen,"' protected as such by the national govern-
74 The Thirteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution on December 31,
1865.
75 Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1862).
76 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 142.
77 Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 383 (1862).
78 The Fourteenth Amendment "was designed primarily to protect the negro race in
their newly acquired rights and privileges." CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NAT-
URAL LAw CONCEPTS 145 (1930) (footnote omitted).
79 Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 394 (1862). General Bates's opinion did not
answer the question of "[w]hether or not it is legally possible for a slave to be a citizen."
Id. at 397; Frederick Douglass answered the question in 1853:
By birth, we are American citizens; by the principles of the Declaration of In-
dependence, we are American citizens; ... by the facts of history, and the ad-
missions of American statements, we are American citizens; by the hardships and
trials endured; by the courage and fidelity displayed by our ancestors in defend-
ing the liberties and in achieving the independence of our land, we are
American citizens. In proof of the justice of this primary claim, we might cite
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ment.8 ° Hence, in Justice and Jurisprudence, the Brotherhood of
Liberty argued that no state or political group could deny to the
black race any right, privilege or immunity possessed by white citi-
zens; if they did, "the burden of proving [the] disfranchisement,"
solely on the basis of "race or color, or any other accidental cir-
cumstance," fell on those who denied rights, privileges or immuni-
ties.8
In 1889, it should have been even more reasonable to per-
suade judicial and public forums of the substance that Attorney
General Bates' opinion: "In every civilized country the individual is
born to duties and rights, the duty of allegiance and the right to
protection; and these are correlative obligations, the one the price
of the other, and they constitute the all-sufficient bond of union
between the individual and his country; and the country he is
born in is przma facie, his country."82
Justice and Jurisprudence claimed that black people possessed
equal political status in the nation because as citizens they were
members of the body politic. 3 Yet, an existing class of whites be-
lieved that the incidental rights of citizenship passed down by
blood and were secured by descent, a view naturally rejected by
black lawyers. The black lawyer believed, as did Attorney General
Bates, "that citizenship ... never 'passes by descent.' It is as origi-
numerous authorities, facts and testimonies,--a few only must suffice.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Claims of Our Common Cause, in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850-1860, supra note 3, at 254, 259. After
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery, the opinion of General
Bates would have made color and race irrelevant to all rights of citizens, as "the Consti-
tution ... is silent about race as it is about color." Citizenship, supra at 398.
80 Citizenship, supra note 79, at 395.
81 I& at 394.
82 Id at 395.
83 Id at 401. See also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 537 (1856)
(McLean, J., dissenting) ("[M]any [members of the colored race] were citizens of the
New England States, and exercised the rights of suffrage when the Constitution was
adopted, and it was not doubted by any intelligent person that its tendencies would
greatly ameliorate their condition."); (Curtis, J, dissenting) ("To determine whether any
free persons, descended from Africans held in slavery, were citizens of the United States
under the Confederation, and consequently at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, it is only necessary to know whether any such persons were
citizens of either of the States under the Confederation, at the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. Of this there can be no doubt. At the time of the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation, all free native born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African
slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but ... electors . . . ."). Id. at 572-73.
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nal in the child as it is in his parents. It is always either born with
him or*given to him directly by law."'
A first principle of the Brotherhood of Liberty was that the
attributes of citizenship were considered sine qua non to birth. Yet,
racism posed a more serious question, one that would haunt the
nation for years to come: Shall the nation carve out a disqualifying
exception to naturally born citizens of African descent on race
alone, justified on the ground that persons of "African descent be
so incompatible with the fact of citizenship that the two cannot
exist together?" ' The end of Reconstruction partially answered
that question. In the South, being black was incompatible with
citizenship, and some believed that being black disqualified the
colored race from all elements of justice." This disqualification is
said to have been advanced by *the creation of "false historical
beliefs," beliefs that "presented the [Negro] as a degraded being
who has no rights that need be respected.""
84 Citizenship, supra note 79, at 399.
85 Id. at 398. The white underclass, though many chose to ignore it, was at one
time subjugated to upper class white people because in some southern states, though free
and without land, a white man could not vote. Id at 402. In 1856, major scholars, prob-
ably read by black lawyers in the New England states, acknowledged that "[n]o definition
of the character of a citizen is contained in the Constitution of the United States."
DUER, supra note 51, at 297. Howev6r, it also was determined that no general guarantee
granted for privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states existed under Arti-
cle IV, Section II of the Constitution. Since the states conferred citizenship only "upon
the highest classes of society," not even "free negroes and mulattoes are . . . citizens as
were contemplated by the Article in question, inasmuch as . . . the Constitution does not
authorize any but 'NwHrrE' persons to become citizens of the United States ... ." Id. at
298. While no expressed presumption against free persons of color is stated in the Con-
stitution, it was written that the Constitution created "a presumption that no State had
made citizens of persons of any other color, one that "will stand until repelled by posi-
tive testimony." Id. (footnotes omitted).
86 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
591-601 (1988). For example, mob violence was used to run black Republicans from
office. Some of them, like William H. Foote of Yazoo City, Mississippi, a black tax collec-
tor, was lynched in 1883. It. at 591. Once the South was given a free hand and federal
troops were withdrawn, "a South Carolina writer predicted early in 1877, they would 'go
so far as they dare in restricting colored liberty . . . without actually reestablishing per--
sonal servitude.'" Id. at 593. See W.E.B. Du BOiS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 691-
92 (reprint 1973); T. HARRY WILLAMS ET AL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES [SINCE
1865] 120-21 (1960), for background leading to the agreement.
87 Historical Beliefs Deternine Racial Attitudes, 22 NEGRO HIST. BULL- 74 (Jan. 1959). See
also FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Mhy is the Negro Lynched?, in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECONSTRUCTION AND AFER, supra note 3, at 491, 500-01, where
Douglass talks about falsifications about the Negro that denied him justice:
You will remember that during ,all the first years of reconstruction, and long
after the war, Negroes were slain by scores. The world was shocked by these
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In 1883, six years after federal troops were withdrawn from
the South and seven years before the publication of Justice and
Jurisprudence, Frederick Douglass described Post-Reconstruction as
follows:
Peace with the old master class has been war on the Negro. As
the one has risen, the other has fallen. The reaction has been
sudden, marked, and violent. It has swept the Negro from all
the legislative halls ofthe Southern States, and from those of
the Congress of the United States. It has, in many cases, driven
him from the ballot box and the jury box.'
Several opinions of the Supreme Court between 1872-89, the peri-
od just prior to the publication of Justice and Jurisprudence, conflict-
ed with the aspirations of the slave progeny. Acts of Congress,
aimed at enlarging the social and political rights and protection of
the slave progeny, were declared unconstitutional.8 9  Black
murders, so that the Southern press and people found it necessary to invent,
adopt and propagate almost every species of falsehood to create sympathy for
themselves, and to formulate excuses for thus gratifying their brutal instincts
against the Negro . . . When a black man's language is quoted, in order to
belittle and degrade him, his ideas are often put in the most grotesque and un-
readable English ....
88 FREDERICK DouGLAss, The United States Cannot Remain Half-Slave and Half Free, in 4
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER, supra note
3, at 354, 355. See generally BRUCE A. RAGSDALE & JOEL D. TREESE, BLACK AMERICANS IN
CONGRESS, 1870-1989 (1990) (listing black Congressmen during the Reconstruction era);
Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against
the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3943 (1990) (discussing
white iolence and the Black Codes).
89 See, e.g., POLITICAL CASES. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (holding act
of Congress making it a crime to obstruct any citizen from voting unconstitutional). JURY
CASES. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding state law mandating jurors
be white people unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313 (1879) (finding Virginia jury administration statute did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment when two blacks, indicted for murder, were, on request, denied pro-
portional race representation on the grand jury.); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)
(applying principles decided in both Strauder and Rives). The black defendant was spared
from an order of execution by the Court because the facts demonstrated that "although
its colored population exceeded twenty thousand in 1870, and 1880 exceeded twenty-six
thousand, in a total population of less than one hundred and fifty thousand-presented
a prima fade case of denial, by the officers charged with the selection of grand and petit
jurors, of that equality of protection which has been secured by the Constitution and
[the] laws of the United States." (emphasis added). See B. Frank Dake, The Negro Before
the Supreme Court, 66 ALBANY L.J. 238 (1904); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882)
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America's mood was somber."
For blacks, one consequence of Post-Reconstruction was the
reversal of social circumstances and political fortune, which caused
the Brotherhood of Liberty to particularly question cases like Hall
v. DeCuir.91 Hall was one of the first Supreme Court cases revers-
ing the forward era of Reconstruction.
In 1869, four years after the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and during the early days of the Post-Reconstruction
era, the Louisiana legislature passed a statute prohibiting intra-
state businesses or common carriers from enforcing rules or regu-
lations that discriminated on account of race or color. Josephine
DeCuir, a woman of color, sued for damages (allowed under the
law) when the master and owner of the steamboat "Governor
Allen" refused her accommodations on account of her race in a
cabin designated for whites only. Her ticket did not contemplate
traveling beyond the borders of Louisiana. DeCuir was awarded a
judgement for $1,000, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Louisiana.9 2 Benson, the owner of the steamboat "Governor
Allen," died, so an administratrix named Hall substituted to pro-
tect his interest. In Hall v. DeCui?3 argued before the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Hall argued that the Louisiana equality law was
unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
94
(applying Strauder). EQUAL PROTECTION CASES. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882) (holding unconstitutional congressional act making it a crime for nvo or more
persons to conspire together for the purpose of depriving persons equal protection of
the laws). EQUAL ACCOMMODATION CASES. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding-
unconstitutional congressional act providing that every race and color were entitled to
equal enjoyment of accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances and the-
aters). For another treatment of these and other cases, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CON-
STITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 383-402
(1985).
90 See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Civil Rights Case, in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER, supra note 3, at 392-93: "[Black
Americans] have been, as a class, grievously wounded, wounded in the house of our
friends, and this wound is too deep and too painful for ordinary measured speech.");
Richard T. Greener, a black lawyer, "called the court's decision 'the most startling deci-
sion ... since [Dred Scott].'" SMITH, supra note 2, at 222 (citing The Civil Rights Act, a
Negro Lauyer on the Court's Decision, N.Y. EVENING POST, Oct. 16, 1883, at 4).
91 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at
42.
92 DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875).
93 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
94 Id. at 488.
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In an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, the Louisiana equality
law was held to be unconstitutional because a state statute disal-
lowing racial discrimination on carriers passing through the state's
portals impermissably burdened interstate commerce. Gibbons v.
Ogden,95 a case thought to be remotely striking down laws enacted
by southern states to advance the equality of all races, now ap-
peared to thwart an ex-slave state from righting its wrongs. The
import of the decision was severe: Unless Congress passed a law
similar to the provision in the Louisiana statute, the Commerce
Clause would continue to permit business and common carriers
passing through a state to segregate their passengers, shielding the
carriers from any liability under a state statute. 6 Racial protection
enacted by a state prohibiting common carriers from segregating
was determined to be invalid on its face. Chief Justice Waite's
short four page opinion, written in 1877 and within months the
end of the Post-Reconstruction era,97 was devastating to blacks,
who viewed the Court's action as a stamp of approval for racism
by the United States under via the Commerce Clause, unless Con-
gress affirmatively acted to disavow it.
Justice Nathan Clifford's concurring opinion further clarified
the majority opinion's position on race. Justice Clifford (originally
from Maine) determined that any carrier enrolled under the laws
of the United States proved the "national character of the shil or
vessel"98 and the need for uniform regulation of such carriers,
even in matters of racial disallowance by the states.99 Racial
equality laws protecting black people in intrastate transit was a
burden on commerce because, as Justice Clifford wrote,
If Louisiana may pass a law forbidding such steamer from hav-
ing two cabins and two tables,-one for white and the other
for 'colored person,-it must be admitted that Mississippi may
pass a law requiring all passenger steamers entering her ports
to have a separate cabins and tables, and make it penal for
white and colored persons to be accommodated in the same
cabin or to be furnished with meals at the same table.'
95 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
96 Hal4 95 U.S. at 490.
97 See generally FONER, supra note 86.
98 Hall 95 U.S. at 496-97.
99 See generally SENATOR PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROB-
ERT BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION BATTLES
191-92 (1992) (revealing that after Justice Clifford was nominated to the Court. "[s]ome
questioned his legal credentials, but more focused on his views on slavery that can best
be described as being somewhere between pro-slavery and fuzzy.").
100 Hal 95 U.S. at 498 (Clifford, J., concurring). Since Congress had not acted
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Furthermore, Justice Clifford aggressively discouraged states
from eliminating Jim Crow laws, regulations, and the general racist
conduct of carriers by passing anti-race statutes. He reasoned that
equality laws passed by states could deprive property owners of
their right to contract and earn profits if white people choose not
to patronize certain carriers with racially integrated accommoda-
tions."'1 Justice Clifford concluded that so long as carriers pro-
vided substantial equality in the accommodations for whites and
blacks, the requirements of the law would be met. Based on this
reasoning, he believed that the Court would uphold such a divi-
sion. Justice Clifford rejected the perceived claim that "equality
[meant] identity.., unless our commercial marine [underwent]
an entire change.""°' In light of the existing precedent of Dred
Scott v. Sandford, to which he refers, Justice Clifford was unwilling
to entertain such a change.1"3
DeCuir must have baffled black citizens in the South and par-
ticularly Louis Andr6 Martinet, a black lawyer in Louisiana who
had passed the bar a year before .DeCuir was -decided.0 4 Martinet
realized that, unless Congress enacted legislation, the Commerce
Clause allowed common carriers to discriminate on the basis of
race, and it disallowed any state action, such as the Lousiana stat-
ute, to end racial discrimination. Yet, black citizens were told in
the Civil Rights Cases that the remedy for unprotected private con-
duct could be obtained solely from "State law or State authority"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Perhaps it was this reason-
against racism, Justice Clifford determined that Congress had made it legal. "Governed by
the laws of Congress, it is 'clear that a steamer carrying passengers may have separate
cabins and dining saloons for white persons and persons of color, for the plain reason
that the laws of Congress contain nothing to prohibit such an arrangement." Id. at 500-
01.
101 Id. at 501, 503.
102 Id. at 503.
103 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), cited in HalI 95 U.S. at
503 (Clifford, J., concurring). In 1858, Justice Clifford succeeded Justice Benjamin Curtis,
who had dissented in Dred Scott Clifford was an "ardent Democrat rather thin a Whig,"
and "a consistent strict constructionist." William Gillette,' Nathan Clifford, in 2 THE JUSTIC-
ES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
963, 964, 967 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). He generally endorsed states'
rights: "Of course there were exceptions, [as in the case of Hall v. DeCuir]". Id. at 971.
104 SMirrH, supra note 2, at 283.
105 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17, 23 (1883). Critically, in JUSTICE AND JURISPRU-
DENCE, the Brotherhood of Liberty construed the decision to mean that "until some State
law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been taken,
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
no legislation of the United States under said Amendment, nor any proceeding under
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ing by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases that led Justice John M.
Harlan to state in his dissent that
Constitutional provisions, adopied in the interest of liberty, and
for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if
need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging
to American citizenship, have been construed as to defeat the
ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted
to accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished
by changes in their fundamental law.'
VI. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE: A CLAIM FOR CIVIC LIFE
Black people received the DeCuir decision "with abject terror,"
and considered it an "attempt to perpetuate the rites of slav-
ery."""7 The fact that the law bifurcated the status of equality by
giving rise to a subtext that equality meant something different for
blacks than it did for whites forced the Brotherhood of Liberty to
vigorously dissent from the interpretation.0 For black lawyers, a
dual meaning of the word equality presented an enormous chal-
lenge during their protracted struggle to enlarge the meaning of
that word to include black Americans. They asserted that such an
interpretation with respect to one race could not work because
the democratic state was far too complex to disallow uniform
themes of equality as an "every-day correlation of the civic life of
the two races.""°
The Brotherhood of Liberty opined that civic life "should be
free, easy, elastic, and natural,""0 a view they asserted in Justice
and Jurisprudence. However, substantial numbers of the white race
trapped in the belief that blacks were arguing for identical equal-
ity across the board were blinded to this assertion. Hence, the
word equality, when used in the context of race, led whites to see
themselves as identical to the progeny of slaves-a conception
which scared and angered them-and made them incapable of
realizing the quest of black people to pursue a civic life.'
such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the Amendment are
against the States laws, and acts done under State authority." JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 9, at 147.
106 Civil Rights, 109 U.S. at 26.
107 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 193.
108 See I& at 418.
109 Id. at 418-19.
110 I.
111 Id. at 392. The Brotherhood of Liberty said that "[n]o metaphysician engaged in
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Justice and Jurisprudence was written to advance a moral theme
related to blacks that had been ignored with "[t]he sudden re-ar-
rangement"1 2 of American society "upon a pure principle of
equality" n" after the American Revolution. This re-arrangement
occured "[b]efore the moral perfection of jurisprudence was suffi-
ciently advanced to admit the doctrine of equality in the distribu-
tion of civil rights,""4 and thus only provided for the benefit and
protection of the civic life of whites. However, the demand for
equality, perhaps also asserted by immigrants,"5 who were at the
bottom of the social and economic ladder,
accounts for the unsympathetic and antagonistic tendencies,
otherwise unintelligible, which ... resulted in the formulation
of the legal fiction, that 'Equality does not mean identity;' and
the development of its natural corollary, that the substantial
accommodation which satisfies the requirements of the law
does not deny the right of the public servant to discriminate
on account of color."
6
The fiction that "the beneficence of the principle of equality"
allowed the state to distribute rights in light of "narrow social
expediency" prevented equality, as a principle of law, from
"run[ing] in its constitutional channel.""' Perhaps this was be-
cause the "doctrine of inequality was originally transported to, and
planted upon [American] soil in the form of slavery,""' thus
rendering the virtues of civic life unattainable to the slave proge-
ny. After emancipation, equality, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, did not lose this dual meaning. It merely widened the gap,
with occasional attempts to patch it through various forms of judi-
cial methodology."'
the investigation of the profound philosophy of language, could ever have dreamed of a
classification of ideas in which the word 'equality' is synonymous with 'identity.'"
112 Id. at 427.
113 Id.; J. Clay Smith, Jr., In Memoriam: Professor Frank D. Reeves: Towards a Houstonian
School of Jurisprudence and the Study of Pure Legal Existence, 18 HoW. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1974).
114 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 427. In JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE,
the Brotherhood of Liberty concluded that there existed a "long-established order of
white civil rights in America" to allow the U.S. Supreme Court to extend the "fundamen-
tal principle of all American liberty" to African Americans. Id. at 73.
115 THoMAs G. GossErr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 287 (1968).
116 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 427.
117 Id. at 451.
118 Id. at 464.
119 Id. at 418-19.
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After 1876, the negative civil rights opinions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court (e.g. DeCuir) as experienced by the members of the
Brotherhood of Liberty, and observed by black lawyers, influenced
their belief that 'Judges must ... be liable to [being] uncon-
sciously swayed by the general current of the feelings and actions
of the individuals and communities around them, who had not
accommodated themselves to the reformation contemplated by the
war amendments."'20 The Brotherhood of Liberty believed that
these decisions stripped blacks of self respect and "relegated [the
black] race back to the status of barbarism."'' The thought of
such retrenchment inspired and heightened the unyielding com-
mitment of black lawyers to reverse this slippery slope of tyranny.
Like Emerson, who would renounce everything deemed un-
true by a reformer, the black lawyer announced:
A rule which refuses to recognize the tie making this race an
integral part of the human family, and disfigures the Four-
teenth Amendment, is not a reasonable rule, for how can that
be reasonable which overturns the foundation-stones of a newly-
created, beautiful civil life, of... all the finer environments of
civic relationship?".
The first principle, clearly articulated in Justice and Jurispru-
dence, was that the nation could not endure if it continued to
subject black people "under the pupilage of the jurisprudents of
DeCuir.""' Rather, they hoped for a national shift to
jurisprudents who would help black citizens "to advance concur-
rently with the other citizens, and be made producers and contri-,
butors to the common stock of the nation.""4 They hoped for a
shift away from "cold judicial formalism Jurisprudence . .. [that]
turns aside and permits' the spirit of man to be brutalized by the
sly public servant."25
120 Id. at 192.
121 Id. at 209.
122 Id. at 350.
123 Id. at 366. Elsewhere, JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE states: "It is well known to
scholars that philosophy and science are inhospitable to caste-prejudice. It is an unintelli-
gent, vagabondish vice. It has no vernacular, no speech, no mental energy, thought, or
depth." Id. at 365.
124 Id. at 366.




What was the black lawyer born for but to be a reformer?
And what reformers the pioneer black lawyers were! In 1844, they
entered the legal profession armed with a belief that the basis of
slavery and the notions of inequality that attached to that culture
were a lie. How could a black lawyer help remake a lie and re-
form it to accommodate the subject of the lie? Armed with the
power of the law that their legal training provided, the pioneer
black bar believed that it was "not in the vain, farcical garb of
'legal fiction', or in temporary expediencies, that jurisprudence
[could] discover its true exposition."'26 From the outset, pioneer
lawyers, such as Macon Bolling Allen, Robert Morris, Sr., Everett J.
Waring; and modern black lawyers, such as Charles Hamilton
Houston and Thurgood Marshall;"' and lay activists, such as Rev-
erend Harvey Johnson, would determine that "[j]urisprudence, as
an institution of the state, must adapt its artificial principles to the
new conditions which environ it."'28
Black lawyers, tie laymen and laywomen" who were mem-
bers of the Brotherhood of Liberty and the authors of Justice and
Jurisprudence, hoped through their book to repair the nature of
man. They sought to provide the legal system an opportunity for a
new beginning, one repudiating the ancestral jurisprudence of
slavery. Jurisprudence, they said, "has no natural tendency, in
itself, to any form of social or political anthropomorphism."'
However, they believed that it was imperative not to allow
jurisprudents to do "nothing more progressive than mark[]
time,"'3' or to wear blinders to "the new citizen [who continued]
to wear the habiliments of the old slave."' 2
126 Id at 450.
127 See Smith, supra note 40, at 503.
128 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 450.
129 There were at least three black women who were life members of the
Brotherhood of Liberty, namely, Irene Davis, Sadie T. Galamison, and Mrs. G.R. Waller.
ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 4. The membership of women in the Brotherhood of Lib-
erty is significant, not only because of the financial support that they provided, but also
because it must be presumed that they had something to say about the content of Jus-
TICE AND JURISPRUDENCE.
130 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 461.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 423.
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In 1889, when Justice and Jurisprudence rolled off the presses at
J.B. Lippincott Company, priced at three dollars,"' the "pagan
theology"' 4 embodied in the jurisprudence of Dred Scott, called
"the antique foot-rule,"135 ominously hung over the fate of the
slave progeny. In Justice and Jurisprudence, the Brotherhood of Lib-
erty did not call for armed insurrection or anarchy, as others
might have felt justified to do.I3 6 It called for a "new graduation"
of jurisprudence capable of adjusting to modem times, "in
keeping with the sociological and industrial progress which [had]
naturally followed this new standard of political truth.""3
The extent to which Justice and Jurisprudence would or has
influenced the law cannot be answered with precision. It surely
must have made an impact on those who read it, and inspired the
lawyers who produced it to incorporate its themes in civil rights
litigation. For the Brotherhood of Liberty, Justice was the end to
be achieved, and Jurisprudence was the means to achieve it. This
would secure the future of black Americans. The Brotherhood of
Liberty consisted of former slaves who, after emancipation, contin-
ued to be treated as slaves. They hungered for the trappings of
citizenship, and were determined to repudiate past ages of slave
jurisprudence which classified people of color as inferior and pro-
vided little protection for their rights.
Since its publication in 1889, whatever influence Justice and
Jurisprudence has had on American law, its origination stands as the
Magna Carta of black people, and its powerful themes now grace
the matrix of American law.'
38
133 T.M. Wakeman, Justice and Jurisprudence: An Inquiry Concerning the Constitutional Lim-
itations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 15 SCIENCE 26 (Jan. 10, 1890)
(book review).
134 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 196.
135 Id. at 451.
136 In 1886, there were white anarchists "trying to persuade the black community to
overthrow the government." SMITH, supra note 2, at 377.
137 JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 9, at 451.
138 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown V.




EXTRACTS FROM THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODES
(The following text is from The Anti-Slavery Bugle, Circa 1840s)
The following are mostly abridged selections from the statutes
of the slave States and of the United States. They give but a faint
view of the cruel oppression to which the slaves [were] subject,
but a strong one enough, it is thought, to fill every honest heart
with a deep abhorrence of the atrocious system. Most of the im-
portant provisions here cited, though placed under the name of
only one state, prevailed in nearly all the States, with slight varia-
tions in language, and some diversity in the penalties. The extracts
have been made in part from Stroud's Sketch of the Slave Laws,
but chiefly from authorized editions of the Statute books referred
to ....
The cardinal principal of slavery, that the slave is not to be
ranked among sentient beings but among things-is an article- of
property-a chattel personal, obtaing as undoubted law in all the
Slave States. [In accordance with this doctrine, an act of Maryland,
1798, enumerates among articles of personal property, "slaves,
working beasts, animals of any kind, stock, furniture, plate, and so
forth."-lb. 23.]-Stroud's Sketch, p. 22.
The dominion of the master is as unlimited, as is that which
is tolerated by the laws of any civilized country, in relation to
brute animals-to quadrupeds; to use the word of the civil law.-
lb. 24. Slaves cannot even contract matrimony. [A slave is not
admonished for incontinence, punished for adultery, nor prose-
cuted for bigamy.-Attorney General of Maryland, Md. Rep. Vol. 1
561.] -lb.61.
LOUISIANA.- A slave is one who is in the power of his
master, to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of
his person, his industry and his labor; he can do nothing, possess
nothing, nor acquire anything but what must belong to his mas-
ter.-Civil Code, Art. 35.
Slaves are incapable of inheriting or transmitting property.-
Civil Code, Art. 945; also Art. 175, and Code of Practice, Art. 103.
Martin's Digest, act of June 1, 1806. Slaves shall always be
reputed and considered real estate; shall be as such subject to be
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mortgaged, according to the rules prescribed by law, and they
shall be seized and sold as real estate.-Vol. 1. p. 612.
Dig. Stat. Sec. 13.-No owner of slaves shall hire his slaves to
themselves, under a penalty of twenty-five dollars, for each of-
fence.-Vol. 1. p. 102.
Sec. 15.-No slave can possess any thing in his own right or
dispose of the produce of his own industry, without the consent of
his master.-p. 103.
Sec. 16.-No slave can be party in a civil suit, or witness in a
civil or criminal matter, against any white person, p. 103. See also
Civil Code, Art. 117, p. 28.
Sec. 18.-A slave's subordination to his master is susceptible of
no restriction, (except in what incites to crime,) and he owes to
him and all his family, respect without bounds, and absolute obe-
dience. p. 103.
Sec. 25.- Every slave found on horseback, without a written
permission from his master, shall receive twenty-five lashes. p. 105.
Sec. 32.- Any freeholder may seize and correct any slave
found absent from his usual place of work or residence, without
some white person, and if the slave resist or try to escape, he may
use arms, and if the slave assault [The legal meaning of assault is
to offer to do personal violence.] and strike him, he may kill the
slave. p. 109.
Sec. 35. It is lawful to fire upon runaway negroes who are
armed, and upon those who, when pursued refuse to surrender. p.
109.
Sec. 38. No slave may buy, sell or exchange any kind of goods,
or hold any boat, or bring up for his own use any horses or cat-
tle, under a penalty of forfeiting the whole. p. 110.
Sec. 7. Slaves or free coloured persons are punished with death
for wilfully burning or destroying any stack of produce or any
building. p. 115.
Sec. 15. The punishment of a slave for striking a white person,
shall be for the first and second offenses at the discretion of the
court, [A court for the trial of slaves consists of one Justice of the
Peace and three freeholders, and the Justice and one freeholder,
i.e. one half the court, may convict, though the other two are for
acquittal.-Martin's Dig. I. 646] but not extending to life or limb,
and for the third offence death, but for grievously wounding or
mutilating a white person, death for the first offence: provided, if
the blow or wound is given in defense of the person or property
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of his master, or the person having charge of him, he -is entirely
justified.
Act of Feb. 22, 1824, Sec. 2. A slave for wilfully striking his
master or mistress, or the child of either, or his white overseer, so
as to cause a bruise or shedding of blood, shall be punished with
death. p. 125.
Act of March 6, 1819. Any person cutting or breaking any iron
chain or collar used to prevent the escape of slaves, shall be fined
not less than two hundred dollars nor more than one thousand
dollars, and be imprisoned not more than two years nor less than
six months. p. 64 of the session.
MISSISSIPPI. Chapt. 92, Sec. 110. Penalty for any slave or free
colored person exercising the functions of a minister of the gos-
pel, thirty-nine lashes; but any master may permit his slave to
preach on his own premises, no slaves but his own being permit-
ted to assemble. Digest of Stat. p. 770.
Act of June 18, 1822. Sec. 21. No negro or mulatto can be a
witness in any case, except against negroes or mulattoes. p. 749,
New Code, 372.
Sec. 25. Any master, licensing his slave to go at large and trade
as a freeman, shall forfeit fifty-dollars to the State, for the literary
fund.
Penalty for teaching a slave to read, imprisonment one year.
For using language having a tendency to promote discontent
among free colored people, or insubordination among slaves,
imprisonment at hard labor, not less than three, nor more than
twenty-one years, or death at the discretion of the court. L.M.
Child's Appeal p. 70.
Sec. 26. It is lawful for any person, and the duty of every sher-
iff, deputy-sheriff, coroner and constable to apprehend any slave
going at large, or hired out by him, or herself and take him or
her before a Justice of the peace, who shall impose a penalty of
not less than twenty dollars, nor more than fifty dollars on the
owner, who has permitted such slave to do so.
Sec. 32. Any negro or mulatto, for using abusive language, or
lifting his hand in opposition to any white person (except in self-
defence against a wanton assault,) shall, on proof of the offence
by oath of such person, receive such punishment as a justice of
the peace may order, not exceeding 39 lashes.
Sec. 41. Forbids the holding of cattle, sheep or hogs by slaves,
even with consent of the master, under penalty of forfeiture, half
to the county and half to the informer.
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Sec. 42. Forbids a slave keeping a dog, under penalty of twen-
ty-five stripes: and requires any master who permits it to pay a fine
of five dollars, and make good all damages done by such dog.
Sec. 43. Forbids slaves cultivating cotton for their own use, and
imposes a fine of fifty dollars on the master or overseer who per-
mits it.
Revised Code. Every negro or mulatto found in the State, not
able to show himself entitled to freedom, may be sold as a slave,
p. 389. The owner of any plantation, on which a slave comes with-
out written leave from his master, and not on lawful business, may
inflict ten lashes for every such offence. p. 371.
ALABAMA. Aiken's Digest. Tit. Slaves, &c., sec. 31. For at-
tempting to teach any free coloured person, or slave, to spell,
read or write; a fine of not less than two hundred and fifty dollars
not more than five hundred dollars! p. 397.
Sec. 35 and 36. Any free coloured person found with slaves in
a kitchen, outhouse or negro quarter, without a written permission
from the master or overseer of said slaves, and any slave found
without such permission, with a free negro on his premises, shall
receive fifteen lashes for the first offence, and thirty-nine for each
subsequent offence; to be inflicted by master, overseer or member
of any patrol company. p. 397.
Toulmin's Digest. No slave can be emancipated but by a special
act of the Legislature. p. 623. Act. Jan. 1st, 1823. Authorizes an
agent to be appointed by the Governor of the State, to sell for
the benefit of the State all persons of colour brought into the
United States, and within the jurisdiction of Alabama, contrary to
the laws of Congress prohibiting the slave trade. p. 643.
GEORGIA. Prince Digest. Act Dec. 19, 1818. Penalty for any free
person of colour (except regularly articled seamen) coming into
the state, a fine of one hundred dollars, and on failure of pay-
ment to be sold as a slave. p. 465.
Penalty for permitting a slave to labour or do business for
himself, except on his master's premises, thirty dollars per week p.
457.
No slave can be a party to any suit against a white man, ex-
cept on claim of his freedom, and every coloured person is pre-
sumed to be a slave, unless he can prove himself free. p. 446.
Act Dec. 13, 1792. Forbids the assembling of negroes under
pretence of divine worship, contrary to the act regulating patrols,
p. 342. This act provides that any justice of the peace may dis-
pense any assembly of slaves which may endanger the peace; and
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every slave found at such meeting shall receive, without trial, 25
stripes! p. 447.
Any person who sees more than seven men slaves without any
white person, in a high road, may whip each slave twenty lashes.
p. 454.
Any slave who harbors a runaway, may suffer punishment to
any extent, not affecting life or limb. p. 452.
SOUTH CAROLINA. Brevard's Digest. Slaves shall be deemed
sold, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal in
the hands of their owners, and possessors, and their executors
administrators, and assigns, to all intents, constructions and pur-
poses whatever. vol. ii., p. 229.
Act of 1740, in the preamble, states that "many- owners of
slaves and others that have the management of them do confine
them so closely to hard labour that they have not sufficient time for
natural rest," and enacts that no slave shall be compelled to labor
more than fifteen hours in the twenty-four,, from March 25th to
September 25, or fourteen in the twenty-four for the rest of the
year. Penalty, from £5 to 20. Vol. ii. p. 243.
[Yet in several of the slave states, the time of work for crimi-
nals whose punishment is hard labour, is eight hours a day, for
three months, nine hours for two months, and ten for the rest of
the year.]
A slave endeavoring to entice another slave to runaway, if
provision be prepared for the purpose of aiding or abetting such
endeavor, shall suffer death. p. 233 and 244..
Penalty for cruelly scalding or burning a slave, cutting out -his
tongue, putting out his eye, or depriving him of any limb, a fine
of £100. For beating with a horse whip, cow-skin, switch or small
stick, or putting irons on, or imprisoning a slave, no penalty or pro-
hibition. p. 241.
Any person who, not having lawful authority to do so, shall
beat a slave, so as to disable him from working, shall pay fifteen
shillings a day, to the owner, for the slave's lost time, ahd the
charge of his cure. p. 231 and 232.
A slave claiming his freedom may sue for it by some friend
who will act as guardian, but if the action be judged groundless,
said guardian shall pay double costs of suit, and such damages to
the owner as the court may decide. p. 260.
Any assembly of slaves or free coloured persons in a secret or
confined place, for mental instruction, (even if white persons are
present,) is an unlawful meeting, and magistrates must disperse it,
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breaking doors if necessary, and may inflict twenty lashes upon
each slave or colored person present. p. 254 and 5.
Meetings for religious worship, before sunrise, or after 9
o'clock P.M., unless a majority are white persons, are forbidden:
and magistrates are required to disperse them. p. 261.
A slave who lets loose any boat from the-place where the
owner has fastened it, for the first offence shall receive 39 lashes,
and for the second shall have one ear cut off p. 228.
James's Digest. Penalty for killing a slave, on sudden heat or
passion, or by undue correction, a fine of $500 and imprisonment
not over 6 months. p. 392.
NORTH CAROLINA.- Haywood's Manual. Act of 1798, Sec. 3
Enacts, that the killing a slave shall be punished like that of a free
man; except in the case of a slave out-lawed, [A slave may be out-
lawed when he runs away, conceals himself, and, to sustain life,
kills a hog, or any animal of the cattle kind, Haywood's Manual,
p. 521.] or a slave offering to resist his master, or a slave dying
under moderate correction. p. 530.
Act of 1799. Any slave set free, except for meritorious services,
to be adjudged of by the county court, may be seized by any free
holder, committed to jail, and sold to the highest bidder. [In South
Carolina, any person may seize such freed man and keep him as
his property.] p. 525.
Patrols are not liable to the master for punishing his slave,
unless their conduct clearly shows malice against the master. Hawk's
Reps., vol. i. p. 418.
TENNESSEE.- Stat. Law, chap. 57, sec. 1. Penalty on master
for hiring to any slave his own time, a fine of not less than one
dollar nor more than two dollars a day, half to the informer. p.
679.
Chap. 2. sec. 102. No slave can be emancipated but on condi-
tion of immediately removing from the state, and the person
emancipating shall give bond, in a sum equal to the slave's value,
to have him removed. p. 279.
Laws of 1813. Chap. 35. In the trial of slaves, the sheriff choos-
es the Court, which must consist of three Justices and twelve slave
holders to serve as jurors.
ARKANSAS.- Rev. Stat., Sec. 4. Requires the patrol to visit all
places suspected of unlawful assemblages of slaves; and sec. 5, pro-
vides that any slave found at such assembly, or strolling about
without a pass, shall receive any number of lashes, at the discre-
tion of the patrol, not exceeding twenty. p. 604.
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MISSOURI.- Laws, L Any master may commit to jail, there
to remain, at his pleasure, any slave who refuses to obey him or his
overseer. p. 309.
Whether a slave claiming freedom, may even commence a suit
for it, may depend on the decision of a single judge. Stoud's Sketch,
p. 78, note which refers to Missouri laws I., 404.
KENTUCKY.- Dig. of Stat., act Feb. 8, 1798, Sec. 5. No colored
person may keep or carry gun, powder, shot, club or other weapon, on
penalty of thirty-nine lashes, and forfeiting the weapon, which any
person is authorized to take.
VIRGINIA.-Rev. Code. Any emancipated slave remaining in
the state more than a year, may be sold by the overseer of the
poor, for the benefit of the literary fund! Vol. I. p. 436.
Any slave or free colored person found at any school for
teaching reading or writing, by day or night, may be whipped a
the discretion of a Justice, not exceeding twenty lashes. p. 424.
Suppl. Rev. Code. Any white person assembling with slaves, for
the purpose of teaching them to read or write, shall be fined, not
less than 10 dollars, nor more than 100 dollars; or with free col-
ored persons, shall be fined not less than 10 dollars, no more
than 100 dollars; or with free colored persons, shall be fined not
more than 50 dollars, and imprisoned not more than two months.
p. 245.
By the revised code, seventy-one offense' are punished with
Death when committed by slaves, and by nothing more than im-
prisonment when by the whites. Stroud's Sketch, p. 107.
Rev. Code. In the trial of slaves, the court consists of five justic-
es without juries, even in capital cases. I. p. 420.
MARYLAND.- Stat. Law, Sec. 8. Any slave for rambling in the
night or riding horses by day without leave, or runiing away, may
be punished by whipping, cropping or branding in the cheek, or
otherwise, not rendering him unfit for labour. p. 237.
Any slave convicted of petty treason, murder, or wilful burning
of dwelling houses, may be sentenced to have the right hand cut off, to be
hanged in the usual manner, the head severed from the body, the body
divided into quarters, and the head and quarters set up in the most public
place in the country where such fact was committed!! p. 190.
-Act 1717, chap. 13, Sec. 5. Provides that any free coloured
person marrying a slave, becomes a slave for life, except mulattoes
born of white women. ,
DELAWARE.-Laws. More than six men slaves, meeting to-
gether, not belonging to one master, unless on lawful business of
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their owners, may be whipped to the extent of 21 lashes each. p.
104.
UNITED STATES.-Constitution. The chief pro-slavery provi-
sions of the Constitution ...are: 1st. slave States are represented
in Congress for three-fifths of their slaves; [By the operation of
this provision, twelve slave holding states, whose white population
only equals that of New York and Ohio, send to Congress 24 sena-
tors and 102 representatives, while these two states only send 4
senators and 59 representatives]; 2nd. that reqiring the giving up
of any run away slaves to their masters; 3rd. a provision pledging
the physical force of the whole country to suppress insurrections,
i.e., attempts to gain freedom by such means as the framers of the
instrument themselves used.
Act of Feb. 12, 1793. Provides that any master or his agent may
seize any person whom he claims as a "fugitive from service," and
take him before a judge of U.S. court, or magistrate of the city or
county where he is taken, and the magistrate, on proof, in support
of the claim, to his satisfaction, must give the claimant a certificate
authorizing the removal of such fugitive to the state he fled from.
[Thus it may be seen that a man may be doomed to slavery by an
authority not considered sufficient to settle a claim of twenty dol-
lars.]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.- The act of Congress incorporat-
ing Washington city, gives the corporation power to prescribe the
terms and conditions on which free negroes and mulattoes may
reside in the city. City Laws, 6 and 11. By this authority, the city in
1827 enacted that any free coloured person coming there to re-
side, should give the Mayor satisfactory evidence of his freedom,
and enter into bond with two free hold sureties, in the sum of
five hundred dollars, for his good conduct, to be renewed each
year for three years; or failing to do so, must leave the city, or be
committed to the work house, for not more than one year, and if
he still refuse to go, may be again committed for the same period,
and so on. lb. 198. -
Coloured persons residing in the city, who cannot prove their
title to freedom, shall be imprisoned as absconding slaves. lb. 198.
Coloured persons found without free papers may be arrested
as runaway slaves, and after two month's notice, if no claimant
appears, must be advertised ten days, and sold to pay their jail
fees. [The prisons of the district, built with the money of the
nation, are used as store houses of the slave-holders' human mer-
chandize. "From the statement of a keeper of a jail in Washing-
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ton, it appears that in five years, upwards of 450 coloured persons
were committed to the national prison in that city, for safe keep-
ing; i.e., until they could be disposed of in the course of the slave
trade, besides nearly 300 who had been taken up as runaways."
Miner's speech in H. Rep. in 1829.] Stroud, 85, note.
The city of Washington grants a license, to trade in slaves, for
profit, as agent or otherwise, for four hundred dollars. City Laws,
p. 249.
Reader, you uphold these laws while you do nothing for their
repeal You can do much. You can take and read the anti-slavery
journals. They will give you an impartial history of the cause, and
arguments with which to convert its enemies. You can counte-
nance and aid those who are laboring for its promotion. You can
petition against slavery; can refuse to vote for slave holders or pro-
slavery men, constitutibns and compacts; can abstain from prod-
ucts of slave labour; and can use your social influence to spread
right principles and awaken a right feeling. Be as earnest for free-
dom as its foes are for slavery, and you can diffuse an anti-slavery
sentiment through your whole neighborhood, and merit "the bless-
ing of them that are ready to perish.
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